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Abstract
We empirically assess spillovers from fiscal policy in the Euro area. We propose a struc-
tural multi-country factor-augmented vector autoregression model identified with sign re-
strictions and analyse the domestic and international effects of fiscal policy measures. By
extracting information from an extended set of country specific and cross-border variables,
we are able to account for the different channels through which government expenditure
shocks are transmitted within as well as across borders. We find significant negative effects
of fiscal consolidations on domestic output, private consumption and investment. More im-
portantly, spending cuts in Italy and Spain induce significant and persistent output spillovers
on Germany and France.
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1 Introduction
The macroeconomic policy debate in the Euro area during the last five years has largely centred
around the international dimension of fiscal policy. While there is a large empirical literature
dealing with the effects of fiscal policy on the domestic economy, very few authors quantify the
magnitude of cross-border spillovers (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013, Hebous and Zimmer-
mann, 2013 inter alia). Such spillovers are particularly important in an economic, monetary and
currency union such as the Eurozone. With strongly interconnected economies, policy measures
implemented at the national level can have significant cross-border repercussions.
In order to assess the international dimension of fiscal policy measures, it may be necessary
to extract information from a large number of domestic and foreign variables. Including a large
number of countries and taking into account potential channels of transmission within as well
as across borders results in an excessively complex, high dimensional dataset which becomes
difficult to analyse with conventional econometric methods. Several modelling approaches have
been considered in the literature: two-country models (Corsetti et al., 2010, Be´nassy-Que´re´ and
Cimadomo, 2007), Global Vector Autoregressions (Hebous and Zimmermann, 2013), aggregated
foreign fiscal shocks (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013, Beetsma et al., 2006) or uni-directional
effects in a panel regression setting (Hebous and Zimmermann, 2012). All of these papers rely
on specific simplifications to bypass the “curse of dimensionality”, either by limiting the number
of cross-sectional units, restricting the channels of interdependence, imposing cross-sectional
homogeneity, or disregarding dynamic feedback effects between units and variables.
We contribute to the literature of domestic and cross-border effects of fiscal policy in a
number of ways. First, we motivate and introduce a multi-country Factor Augmented Vector
Autoregression (MC-FAVAR) model where both observable and unobservable factors are in-
cluded. To this aim, we combine the multi-country VAR approach of Canova and Ciccarelli
(2009) with the FAVAR framework of Bernanke et al. (2005). Nested in an unrestricted VAR,
our modelling approach is therefore better able to capture rich patterns of dynamic interdepen-
dence within as well as across borders. Second, we augment the set of country specific aggregates
(output and its main components) with variables that seem to play an important role in the
domestic transmission of fiscal policy shocks, for example real wages and a measure of business
and consumer confidence. Third, we include cross-border variables relevant for capturing the
strength of bilateral economic and financial links. As a result, we are able to extract important
information captured by the channels through which fiscal spillovers materialise. Fourth, we
pay particular attention to the identification of fiscal policy shocks in a multi-country setting.
We opt for an agnostic, sign restriction approach similar to the one proposed by Mountford
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and Uhlig (2009) which is well suited for identifying country specific (domestic) government
expenditure shocks.
We investigate the effects of (coordinated) fiscal policy shocks in a multi-country model
comprising of the main core and peripheral Eurozone economies: Germany, France, Italy and
Spain. We find that 1) domestic multipliers range between 0.5 for Italy and 1 for Germany and
never surpass unity; 2) cross-border spillovers from contractionary fiscal policy are significant
but, in contrast with the sizeable cross-border multipliers obtained by Hebous and Zimmermann
(2013) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), economic activity consistently reacts stronger
to a domestic consolidation than to a foreign fiscal shock; 3) fiscal shocks originating in Italy and
Spain have the strongest cross-border effects and spillovers are particularly large when these two
peripheral countries jointly engage in a process of fiscal consolidation; 4) domestic confidence
generally declines across all countries but we find mixed dynamics between confidence levels
and sovereign bond yields, depending on whether the fiscal shocks originate in the peripheral
economies (negative relationship) or core countries (positive relationship).
The goal of Section 2 is to shed more light on the complex issue of cross-border spillovers,
both in terms of transmission channels as well as with regards to the modelling difficulties
generally arising. In Section 3, we discuss the data which we believe is relevant for addressing
our research question and introduce the MC-FAVAR model used in the empirical analysis. In
Section 4, we discuss in detail the identification of the underlying structural model and explain
how we characterise coordinated fiscal policy shocks in a multi-country set-up. We summarise
in Section 5 the domestic and cross-border effects of fiscal consolidation obtained using our
multi-country model.
2 Modelling cross-country fiscal spillovers
2.1 Channels of transmission
With increasing integration, many authors have argued that the level of interdependence across
countries has strengthened and that cross-border externalities are likely to represent a growing
part of macroeconomic dynamics (Pesaran et al., 2007, Canova et al., 2007, Canova and Cic-
carelli, 2012 inter alia). It is therefore crucial to account for interdependencies across countries
and sectors when analysing the transmission of economic shocks in a system of interconnected
economies. The strength of cross-border responses is strongly connected to these links: the
stronger the countries are connected the larger spillovers are expected to be.
The primary channel of fiscal policy spillovers discussed in the literature is trade. Exist-
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ing theoretical models of open economies predict that an increase in government consumption
will lead to higher import demand (twin deficit hypothesis) due to both direct effects (higher
aggregate demand) and indirect effects (real exchange rate appreciation/price level increase).
As a result of the deterioration in the trade balance, stimulus “leaks” reduce domestic fiscal
multipliers but create a positive effect on foreign output. The transmission channel of the fiscal
shock across borders is however heavily influenced by a series of factors such as the degree of
openness of the economy, the “home bias” in government expenditures, the degree of substi-
tution between foreign and home produced goods, the response of monetary policy, as well as
the degree of price rigidity (see Corsetti et al., 2010, Corsetti and Mu¨ller, 2007, Beetsma, 2008,
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014).
Recent empirical papers dealing with the topic of fiscal spillovers also mainly focus on trade
linkages. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) quantify empirically the dynamic cross-border
effects of fiscal policy in OECD countries by using direct projections. In a first step, they iden-
tify domestic fiscal shocks as the unanticipated part of spending forecast errors after controlling
for an extensive information set, and calculate trade weighted averages of foreign fiscal shocks
for each country. The weighting scheme underlines the assumption that spillovers materialise
through trade links: the increase in government purchases of country i is partially directed into
higher imports from country j. The authors find significant spillover effects from the aggregate
foreign shocks and output multipliers exceeding one. A potential drawback is that their panel
analysis uses aggregate fiscal innovations and is not suitable for tracing the cross-border effects
of distinct, country specific shocks. Moreover, the homogeneity assumption underlying the panel
specification implies that only average, group-specific spillover effects can be estimated. In a
similar two-stage approach, Beetsma et al. (2006) first identify structural domestic fiscal shocks
from a VAR model and, in a second step, evaluate whether it significantly influences the imports
of country i (domestic) from country j (foreign). The authors find that a 1% increase in Ger-
man government spending leads to an output response of about 0.1% in France, Italy and Spain
after two years.1 It is, however, difficult to asses whether these responses are significantly dif-
ferent from zero since country-specific confidence intervals are not reported. Moreover, the final
output spillovers are not computed from a system estimation but rather by combining (multi-
plying) responses from two independent steps. Hebous and Zimmermann (2012) use exogenous
consolidation episodes based on narrative records and find that a foreign, trade weighted fiscal
contraction induces a substantial decline in domestic output. The multipliers obtained are in the
range of 3 to 7 for the first year following the shock. Similar to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
1Maximum spillovers, of around 0.4% are found in Austria and Belgium.
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(2013), the effects are estimated by panel data regression techniques and thus important en-
dogenous interactions among variables can no longer be analysed.
Another potentially important channel of policy spillovers may be generated through cross-
border financial linkages. Krugman (2008) highlights the increasing importance of the “in-
ternational finance multiplier” for the transmission of shocks in a globalised world economy and
identifies financial institutions as the core source of interdependence between countries. There
is a growing literature on the domestic and cross-border risk transmission between the sovereign
and banking sectors in the Euro area (see e.g. Bicu and Candelon, 2013). The observed inter-
connectedness arises from important bail-out funds and guarantees used by governments, and,
respectively, from massive purchases of sovereign debt by banks. Adjustments in governments’
balance sheets resulting from both discretionary policy and changes in the risk perception of
sovereign debt are hence expected to have an influence on bank’s balance sheets and lending
activity. The elimination of cross-border restrictions and harmonisation of regulation2 led to a
significant increase in the level of financial integration in the Eurozone. As a result, aggregate
consumption and investment in one country can be affected by fluctuations in lending extended
by foreign banks. More recently, following an increase in banking risk and a process of delever-
aging, credit supply constraints have had a dampening impact on consumption and investment
across the common currency area. Coupled with an economic environment characterised by
low aggregate demand and high risk aversion, cross-border and domestic banking intermedia-
tion has experienced a gradual decline, further dampening economic growth across the common
currency area.3 Recent experience has highlighted the pro-cyclical nature of capital flows and
its destabilising role on economic activity within as well as across borders (Brunnermeier et al.,
2012).
Empirical work on fiscal spillovers arising from financial linkages is more limited. Hebous and
Zimmermann (2013) employ the Global VAR methodology in a sample of 12 Euro area countries
and use weights calculated according to bilateral trade or capital flows when defining country
specific foreign factors. The authors compare the output response following a domestic fiscal
shock to that of an area-wide shock, i.e. a synchronised unit change in the primary budged
deficit of all foreign countries. Across all Euro members, the spillovers from a coordinated,
union-wide fiscal consolidation are stronger than the responses to a domestic shock. While this
may not be considered an unreasonable result prima facie, the magnitude of spillovers relative
2For banking activity in the EU, the most notable first steps towards the single market were taken through
the first and second banking directives (77/780/EEC and 89/646/EEC).
3Latest ECB data for 2014 show that loans extended by monetary and financial institutions to non-financial
corporations and households within the Euro area are continuing to decline.
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to domestically induced fiscal effects is unrealistically large. Furthermore, the use of generalised
impulse responses (Pesaran and Shin, 1998) makes a structural interpretation of the identified
fiscal policy shocks difficult.
Moving beyond classical balance sheet connections (“real” channels), Bachmann and Sims
(2012) show that psychological factors may matter for the propagation of fiscal policy shocks.
The authors find that output and confidence levels react positively to fiscal expansions. When
blocking the confidence channel, the output reaction is much weaker, especially in times of
crisis. Taking into account the central role of economic sentiment in the European austerity
debate, it is relevant to understand how domestic and foreign confidence indicators react when
each of the countries included in our empirical analysis engages in a process of fiscal consolidation.
Confidence indicators capture systematic developments in business and consumer expectations
and contain signals from other relevant but unmodelled variables. Hence, psychological factors
are likely to to play a role in the transmission of fiscal shocks in a monetary union.4 To our
knowledge, there is no empirical paper which investigates the link between confidence and fiscal
policy spillovers.
2.2 Multi-country modelling approaches
Modelling multi-country dynamics in a coherent econometric framework is difficult. On the
one hand, failing to include a large set of variables, to control for all relevant channels through
which spillovers may arise can lead to omitted variables bias. On the other hand, including
a large number of countries and variables, which may be relevant for disentangling the effects
of policy from other shocks, makes estimating an unrestricted model unfeasible: the number of
parameters to estimate increases exponentially with the cross-sectional size, while the number of
observations only increases linearly. The parameter proliferation issue results in noisy estimates,
unstable predictions and difficult to interpret temporal dependence. To tackle this issue of
reducing dimensionality in a dynamic framework, several approaches have been suggested in the
literature. Typically these are nested in an unrestricted VAR model. Frequently used models
include the Global VAR (GVAR), collections of bilateral VARs, Bayesian VARs, sparse VARs,
Panel VARs, or factor models.
The GVAR (Pesaran et al., 2004, Dees et al., 2007) was developed for the purpose of capturing
spillovers in multi-country analyses, where a particular structure on the strength of interdepen-
dencies is imposed. Each country-specific VAR is augmented with a foreign factor, calculated
4High risk aversion and “flight-to-quality” reactions have played an important role in the pricing of sovereign
debt during the crisis (see, inter alia, De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). The systematic link between fiscal consolidations,
confidence and sovereign bond yields may be relevant to investigate as well.
6
as a weighted average of foreign variables according to economic or financial bilateral links. The
GVAR is a large constrained VAR, where restrictions arise as a result of the weights imposed
on foreign variables, as well as from the exogeneity of each foreign factor with respect to the
long run parameters of the corresponding domestic VAR. Since the GVAR is designed to be
used in applications with a large cross-sectional dimension, these exogeneity assumptions can
be interpreted as no long-run feedback from any individual country (except the dominant unit)
to the dynamics of the foreign factor. While the GVAR has some appealing features, a series
of concerns have been raised regarding the factorisation of the joint density for the domestic
and foreign variables (see Ericsson, 2011). Furthermore, imposing weak exogeneity restrictions
and estimating each country-specific VAR independently may not be justified for our empirical
analysis, given that we include a small number of countries that are strongly interconnected.
The implications of the underlying restrictions for the dynamics of the system and for the trans-
mission of shocks across countries are difficult to assess. Considering these drawbacks, we do
not purse this direction further.
Bayesian VARs represent another approach for overcoming the curse of dimensionality.
Macroeconomic time series tend to exhibit a high degree of comovement. As argued by De
Mol et al. (2008), when significant collinearity is present in the data, the relevant factors driv-
ing most of the dynamics in the data can be extracted through Bayesian shrinkage techniques.
When analysing the effects of a monetary policy shock in a large scale VAR, Banbura et al.
(2010) use the Minnesota prior to shrink the diagonal elements of the VAR parameter matrix
to zero or one, depending on the order of integration, and the remaining coefficients to zero.
The authors find that their shrinkage procedure leads to credible impulse responses. The main
drawback of such a shrinkage procedure when applied in a multi-country setting is that it indis-
criminately shrinks all non-diagonal coefficients to zero, disregarding the panel structure of the
data. This also restricts the transmission of shocks across countries, since coefficients capturing
cross-border interdependencies are effectively reduced towards zero.
Sparse estimation methods in a VAR setting, such as the Lasso (e.g. Kock and Callot, 2015),
suffer from similar shortcomings. The Lasso estimator applies an equal penalisation and, hence,
the same amount of shrinkage for each parameter. Considering the strong comovement in do-
mestic macroeconomic aggregates and significant cross-border interdependence, zero restrictions
and sparsity patterns are difficult to reconcile with economic intuition.
A more suitable approach to limit parameter proliferation in macroeconomic analyses is the
multi-country VAR framework of Canova and Ciccarelli (2009). Canova and Ciccarelli model
the cross-sectional dependence in terms of an observable factor model and use unweighted lin-
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ear combinations of right-hand-side variables as regressors. The estimation problem is reduced
to identifying a small number of loadings, and the coefficients are decomposed into effects in-
duced by variable, country, equation specific factors and other common indicators which may
be deemed relevant for the empirical question analysed. While providing an intuitive and inter-
pretable way of capturing commonalities in the data, this economically motivated but relatively
ad-hoc modelling approach may not result in the best statistical fit. It is likely that the left-
over unexplained component still contains unmodelled commonality and serial correlation not
picked up by these observable factors. Moreover, important driving forces and channels for the
transmission of shocks across borders (in particular bilateral trade and financial relationships),
cannot be easily incorporated in this factor structure. To account for any unmodelled features
of the data (and thus to provide a better fit to the data), Canova and Ciccarelli allow for time
varying parameters. In our view, this would complicate a structural analysis since the param-
eter drifting is introduced ad-hoc (and not based on economic arguments) and, hence, lacks a
genuine structural interpretation.5
Dynamic factor models (Forni et al., 2000, 2005) and factor augmented VAR (FAVAR)
models (Bernanke et al., 2005) rely on the assumption that a significant proportion of the
movements and interdependence in a set of time series can be captured through a small number
of common factors. The factors are extracted through statistical techniques and are, hence,
unobservable and difficult to interpret.6 We believe that it is crucial to identify an interpretable
structure based on economic intuition in parallel with adding statistical factors to account for any
remaining commonalities. Moreover, the dynamic responses of a large set of (country-specific)
variables are of interest for the identification of structural fiscal policy shocks (see Section 4),
making the estimation of an unrestricted FAVAR unfeasible.
To tackle some of the major challenges posed by the listed empirical approaches, we propose
a dynamic model consisting of observed and unobserved factors which is nested in a VAR. More
specifically, we combine the multi country VAR approach of Canova and Ciccarelli (2009) with
the FAVAR framework of Bernanke et al. (2005) and summarise the information captured by
our variables through a reduced number of observable and unobservable factors. In Section 3.2
we will describe in more detail the exact specification used.
5Furthermore, the estimation of time-varying parameter VARs is usually carried out in a Bayesian framework,
and it is much less straightforward to implement when relying on a frequentist approach, which we will consider
in this paper.
6 Suitably selected rotations may partially alleviate this issue and allow the factors to be directly associated
to a specific variable or sets of variables.
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3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
We include in our empirical analysis the four largest economies in the common currency area:
Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.7 All variables are of quarterly frequency and the time period
covered is 1999:Q1 to 2012:Q4.8
The main variables of interest for our analysis correspond to domestic macroeconomic aggre-
gates, namely output (GDP) and its main components, private consumption and investment. As
a measure of fiscal policy, we are consistent in our variable definition with Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and calculate government expenditures by aggregating
government final consumption expenditure and investment. We augment the set of domestic
variables with data on real wages, unit labour costs (ULC), and the harmonised consumer price
index (HCPI). Theoretical closed economy models predict that the output effect of fiscal policy
is crucially influenced by the reaction of real wages. While models based on Neoclassical theory
predict a decline in real wages and, as a result, a drop in private consumption, New-Keynesian
models imply a positive reaction in wages and consistently find larger output multipliers. More-
over, measures of relative competitiveness such as unit labor costs and the general price level
may be relevant for disentangling the effects of policy changes, both domestically and across
borders. Referring to the confidence channel previously highlighted, we include Eurostat’s Eco-
nomic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) as well as 10-year sovereign bond yields. The ESI summarises
survey responses across five sectors (industry, services, construction, retail trade and consumers)
and represents an aggregate measure of consumer and business confidence. Long-term borrowing
costs are a direct indicator of how a government’s creditworthiness is perceived by the market
and reflect both fundamental as well as risk aversion/confidence factors. This set of nine time
series are relevant for the transmission of fiscal policy changes within country borders and have
a clear panel structure. We refer to these series as domestic variables.
We believe that further extracting information from bilateral variables capturing the
strength of economic and financial links is crucial for our empirical analysis. To this aim,
we include bilateral exports for each pair of countries in our sample and, as a measure of bi-
lateral financial links, cross-border claims of internationally active banks. The financial system
in Europe is mainly bank based, with the banking sector providing around 70% of funding.
As a result, the majority of capital flows are channeled across borders through global banks
(Brunnermeier et al., 2012). We use data on “Consolidated claims, immediate borrower basis”
7These countries cover about 77% of total output (GDP) in the Eurozone.
8For a more detailed description of the data and sources used, see Appendix A.
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collected by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), which have been widely used for mon-
itoring the cross-border exposures of internationally active banks. These consolidated statistics
are reported at country level and aggregate the international claims of all banks headquartered
in the respective country. This covers quarterly balance sheet positions of reporting banks, in-
cluding loans, deposits, securities and derivative contracts. The cross-border bank claims have
as counterparty a foreign debtor in either the bank, non-bank, private or public sector.
We transform all variables, except the confidence measure and price/costs series, in real
per capita terms and calculate year-on-year growth rates. Furthermore, we standardise each
growth rate in order to account for different variability patterns across variables. The need for
standardisation, which will become apparent in Section 3.2, is motivated by the fact that the
regressors in our model are constructed as unweighted averages across different data dimensions.9
3.2 The multi-country factor augmented vector autoregressive model (MC-
FAVAR)
Our model builds on the multi-country VAR framework of Canova and Ciccarelli (2009). Canova
and Ciccarelli model the cross-sectional dependence in terms of an observable factor model and
allow for dynamic interdependencies between units (countries). We start motivating our model
with an unrestricted VAR(1) which stacks the domestic variables yi,t:

y1,t
y2,t
...
yN,t

=

Γ1
Γ2
...
ΓN


y1,t−1
y2,t−1
...
yN,t−1

+

e1,t
e2,t
...
eN,t

, (1)
where yi,t is a K × 1 vector of variables for each country i, i = 1, ..., N , t = 1, ..., T , Γi is
of size K × KN and ei,t is a K × 1 vector of disturbances. With a limited number of times
series observations and a large number of parameters (K2N2), we are unable to estimate all
coefficients without imposing restrictions. We need to reduce the dimensionality of the model
while minimising the loss of information arising from the restrictions imposed. Following Canova
and Ciccareli (2009), we first rewrite the VAR in SUR form:
Yt = Wtγ + et, (2)
9Since we still found evidence of a trending behaviour, we further linearly de-trended six of our 60 time series
prior to the standardisation.
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with Yt = [y1,t′, y2,t′, ..., yN,t′]′, Wt = INK ⊗ Y ′t−1, and γ = (γ′1, ..., γ′N )′, where γi are NK × 1
vectors containing the K stacked rows in Γi, i = 1, ..., N . Since an unrestricted estimation of γ
is not possible, Canova and Ciccareli (2009) propose decomposing the parameters into a lower
dimensional set of determinants:
γ = Ωθ + u = Ω1θ1 + Ω2θ2 + ...+ Ωfθf + u, (3)
where the components of θ (i.e. θi, i = 1, ..., f) account for effects due to either country specific,
variable specific or other “factors” which may be relevant for each specific empirical question
and data structure. Ω = Ω1, ...,Ωf are selection matrices that aggregate the information in
the lagged series according to specific data dimensions. Finally, u represents the left-over,
unexplained component. Substituting the parameterisation (3) into the VAR model (2), we
obtain:
Yt =
f∑
i=1
Wt(Ωiθi + u) + et =
f∑
i=1
zitθi + t, (4)
where zit = WtΩi and t contains remaining unmodelled features not captured by the factorisa-
tion as well as random disturbances. It is easy to see from representation (4) that the VAR is
now rewritten as an observable factor model. The explanatory factors are linear combinations of
appropriately selected right-hand-side variables. In contrast to a typical VAR, where the effect
on each left-hand-side variable is allowed to be different, the coefficients are now composed of
qualitatively equal responses across certain data categories and dimensions.
Similar to Canova and Ciccarelli (2009), we decompose the VAR parameters into K vari-
able specific and KN equation specific determinants. The exact interpretation of these effects
(“loadings”) will be clarified through the example described below. As an additional distinct
feature of our model, we allow the aggregate information in each country to induce a different
effect, depending on whether the modelled relationships are captured within-country or are due
to foreign influences. To this aim, we differentiate between “Home” (H = {H1,H2, ...,HN}) and
“Cross-border” influences (C = {Cj→i, i , j}), where the latter quantify the effect of country
j on i. Notice that we therefore allow for different strengths of spillovers among all pairs of
countries. In total, we decompose the K2N2 parameters in K +KN +N +N(N − 1) distinct
“loadings”, corresponding to the effects induced by each variable, equation and country factors
respectively.
Let us illustrate our VAR(1) re-parameterisation through a simplified two countries (N = 2),
two variables (K = 2) example. The K×KN elements of Γi, i ∈ {1, 2} represent the impact that
the lagged regressors, both domestic and foreign, exert on each of the K domestic variables in
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country i. By using the set of factors described above, the coefficients are now decomposed into
economically interpretable effects: i.e. equation specific E = {E1, E2, E3, E4}, variable specific,
V = {V1,V2}, home specific H = {H1,H2} and cross-border specific C = {C1, C2}:
Γ1
Γ2
 =

E1 + V1 +H1 E1 + V2 +H1 E1 + V1 + C1 E1 + V2 + C1
E2 + V1 +H1 E2 + V2 +H1 E2 + V1 + C1 E2 + V2 + C1
E3 + V1 + C2 E3 + V2 + C2 E3 + V1 +H2 E3 + V2 +H2
E4 + V1 + C2 E4 + V2 + C2 E4 + V1 +H2 E4 + V2 +H2

(5)
Each distinct component of the factorised parameter matrix (5) can be obtained by regres-
sions on appropriately selected combinations of the lagged domestic series. More specifically, we
aggregate the right hand side information contained in each equation (χEt =
∑N
i=1
∑K
j=1 yi,j,t−1),
each domestic variable (χvariable 1t =
∑N
i=1 yi,1,t−1 and χvariable 2t =
∑N
i=1 yi,2,t−1) and each country
(χcountry 1t =
∑K
j=1 y1,j,t−1 and χ
country 2
t =
∑K
j=1 y2,j,t−1). Underlining such decomposition is the
empirical observation of significant comovement present within each country and for the same
variable measured across countries. Each component of the parameter matrix can therefore be
interpreted as the loading on an observable factor, i.e. the respective sum of covariates.10 The
equation specific component, for example, will capture an effect which is common for each row
of the VAR. Alternatively, since the same lagged explanatory variables are included in all VAR
equations, these effects can be interpreted as KN distinct responses of each left hand side vari-
able to a common indicator (χEt ). χ
country 1
t and χ
country 2
t capture the dynamics of all domestic
variables in countries one and two. This information will be used to trace the components in
the parameters attributed to home and foreign effects, depending on the panel individual whose
dynamic movements we are trying to explain. With two countries, the foreign factor for the first
country is fully captured by the country specific variables of country two and vice-versa. The
number of parameters to be estimated has declined from 16 (K2N2) to 10 (four equation specific
loadings, two variable loadings, two home and two foreign effects). It is easy to see that the
improvement in terms of dimensionality reduction is much more pronounced when the number
of countries and variables increases.
If the parameterisation of the VAR in (5) is able to fully capture the serial and cross-sectional
correlation in our domestic time series, this model is well suited to conduct a multi-country anal-
ysis within a VAR framework. However, our tight parameterisation might not capture all serial
dependence in the data. Furthermore, by not including relevant bilateral variables, we might
10Standardising all growth rates in a first step, as discussed in Section 3.1, ensures that the equal weighting
scheme is suitable.
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omit information which is important for the transmission and recovery of structural shocks. We
therefore augment our multi-country VAR with bilateral variables capturing trade and financial
links (Xt). These time series capture valuable insights into the transmission channels through
which fiscal policy shocks spill over across borders. These variables do not have an obvious
panel structure and it is unclear where to position them in the multi-country VAR. Are exports
from Germany to Spain a German specific or a Spain specific variable? Similarly in the case
of cross-border claims, would an increase in the willingness of German banks to lend to Italian
counterparties signal a positive outlook for Germany (supply) or rather for Spain (demand)?
As a solution to this modelling uncertainty, as well as to account for any remaining systematic
component in the country specific variables that our factorisation was not able to capture, we
further augment our multi-country VAR with latent factors. Our main interest lies in quantifying
the effect of fiscal measures on economic activity, within as well as across borders. The country-
specific/panel variables and their dynamics are at the core of the shock identification procedure
and are relevant for disentangling the effects of fiscal policy from other shocks, as we will describe
in Section 4. However, additional data might still be relevant when quantifying the effect of
fiscal policy in a multi-country model. We assume that the fluctuations in the bilateral (cross-
border) variables Xt and the leftover unexplained component in the domestic variables Yt can
be captured by a reduced number of latent factors Ft. We augment the multi-country VAR with
these factors and our final model is a FAVAR with both observable and unobservable factors.
The joint dynamics of the domestic variables Yt and the r latent factors Ft are described by
the following FAVAR model:
Yt
Ft
 =
A B
C D

Yt−1
Ft−1
+ wt, (6)
The relatively short time series dimension makes an unconstrained estimation of (6) unfea-
sible and we impose a number of restrictions on the parameter matrices in the FAVAR (6). The
upper left block of the parameter matrix, A, is a KN×KN matrix capturing within country and
cross-country interdependence among our macroeconomic variables of interest. The elements of
A will be decomposed according to the factorisation described by (5), i.e. equation, variable,
home and foreign influences. The r×KN matrix C traces the influence of country specific aggre-
gates on the latent factors. We also factorise these effects in line with the structure imposed for
A, with the difference that differentiating between home and foreign effects is no longer possible
due to the latent nature of Ft. It is important to highlight that while the factorisation and the
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underlying linear combinations used to obtain the factorisation is almost identical for A and C,
the actual loadings are, however, allowed to be different. B is of size KN × r and traces the
effects of the unobserved factors on our aggregate macroeconomic fundamentals while the r× r
matrix D describes the time dependence of the latent factors. We leave D and B unconstrained,
since it is not clear what type of factorisation could be applied with respect to the unobserved
factors Ft. We therefore impose no a priori restrictions on the effect of the country variables Yt
on Ft nor on the autoregressive structure of the latent factors.
It is not possible, however, to directly estimate (6) because the factors are unobservable.
The common factors are related to the set of M bilateral (informational) variables Xt and the
remaining unexplained dynamics after the factorisation is applied to the domestic variables Yt,
as described by the following auxiliary model:
Yt
Xt
 =
Φ 0
0 0

Yt−1
Xt−1
+ΛFFt + vt, (7)
where ΛF is a (KN + M) × r parameter matrix. We use the auxiliary model (7) to extract
the latent factors Ft. Φ captures the within-country and cross-border dependencies for our
variables of interest in Yt and has, again, the same factorised structure as the parameter matrix
A described above. The remaining parameters in the auxiliary model are set to zero since it is
not clear what type of factors associated with the cross-border variables could be defined. The
cross-sectional common information and time dependence in Yt not captured by ΦYt−1, as well
as the cross border variables Xt will therefore be parsimoniously described by a reduced number
of unobservable factors Ft. By imposing an interpretable structure on Φ, we are able to label and
clearly interpret the type of information contained in our observable factors and even quantify
the relative importance of each factor in explaining the dynamics of our variables of interest
Yt. Any systematic components in the cross-border variables and the remaining unmodelled
features in Yt are extracted through a principal component analysis.
After obtaining an estimate for Ft, the multi-country FAVAR (6) can be estimated by GLS
(see Appendix B for an outline of the estimation strategy for the auxiliary and the multi-country
FAVAR model. We identify two latent factors.). Using the R2 as a ”goodness-of-fit” measure, we
find that our final model (6) is able to explain a significant percentage of the dynamic movements
and variation in the NK domestic variables contained in Yt. We obtain an R2 of 43% when only
the factorisation (5) is applied and 72% when we further include latent factors.
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4 Identification
Based on our final model, the multi-country FAVAR (6), we now proceed by describing the
identification approach. Identification in the VAR literature aims at translating the one-period-
ahead forecast errors, wt, into economically interpretable (fundamental or structural) shocks,
say ηt. The KN + r structural shocks, which are mutually orthogonal and assumed to have
unit variance, are defined as Pηt = wt, where P has the property PP ′ = Σw. Each column
pj , j = 1, ..,KN + r, of P corresponds to an impulse vector of a one standard error innovation
in the respective fundamental shock ηjt, the j-th entry of ηt. Since the exact identification of
one impulse vector corresponds to the exact identification of one shock, only m columns of P
have to be identified if one is interested in a subset of m < KN + r shocks. There is a variety
of possible decompositions of Σw that orthogonalise the impulse responses (Cholesky, spectral,
Schur, etc.). Note, however, that any such orthogonalised impulse matrix P can be rotated by
an orthogonal matrix Q = [q1, ..., qKN+r] such that P˜ = PQ, P˜ P˜ ′ = Σw. Each rotation results
in a different decomposition and in different impulse vectors [p˜1, ..., p˜KN+r] = [Pq1, ..., P qKN+r].
We identify structural shocks by using sign restrictions. The idea of identifying a structural
shock through sign restrictions is as follows: given a matrix P , collect all unit vectors q such that
the impulse responses associated to the impulse vector p˜ = Pq fulfil the imposed sign restric-
tions, discard the others. The object of interest is thus the set of valid impulse responses. This
corresponds to the pure sign restriction approach proposed by Uhlig (2005). The identification
of multiple impulse vectors (i.e. multiple shocks), say p˜1 = Pq1 and p˜2 = Pq2, obviously requires
the additional restriction q′1q2 = 0. In contrast, the penalty function approach of Mountford
and Uhlig (2009) exactly identifies an impulse vector11 by minimising some criterion function
which penalises corresponding impulse responses in the wrong direction and rewards responses
in the desired directions. The exact identification of impulse responses greatly simplifies the
construction of inference, in particular within a frequentist framework.12 In our setting, the
penalty function approach appears to be particularly appealing for identifying domestic shocks.
Since the responses in certain domestic variables are pushed as far as possible in the desired
direction, we can interpret the sign identified structural shocks as being country specific (id-
iosyncratic) and limit the probability that such movements may be due to other common or
foreign influences.
For each country we identify a government spending shock and a business cycle shock (8
shocks in total) that are, by construction, mutually orthogonal. In particular, the orthogonality
11and, hence, a unique structural model
12See Moon et al. (2013).
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between the fiscal and business cycle shocks rules out the impact of automatic stabilisers on fiscal
variables and help us distinguish genuine fiscal policy shocks from movements due to business
cycle influences. If we would not control for the stance of the economy, we could easily end up
confusing a decrease in government expenditures caused by an economic upswing with a decline
in government spending due to a contractionary policy. Let us now describe in detail the sign
restrictions employed in the identification procedure. We identify country specific business cycle
shocks13 as impulse vectors of unit length that jointly move domestic output, consumption and
investment in the same direction for the first four quarters following the shock, including the
quarter of impact. Such comovements can result from a number of different supply and demand
shocks. In line with Mountford and Uhlig (2009), we do not try to separate such causes and
remain agnostic with respect to how business cycles may arise. The “basic” (non-coordinated)
fiscal policy shocks are identified as impulse vectors that jointly move domestic government
spending in the same direction during four consecutive quarters. All fiscal shocks are orthogonal
to each other and to the business cycle shocks. Note that our fiscal shocks do not restrict the
dynamics of GDP and its components: the resulting dynamics of domestic and foreign output
in response to our fiscal shocks represent our main quantity of interest.
These four country specific fiscal shocks offer valuable insights into the domestic and cross-
border effects of fiscal policy. However, since no restrictions are imposed on the dynamics of
government expenditures in the remaining economies, it may be difficult to disentangle pure,
domestically induced output responses from influences due to comovements in other policy
variables. Moreover, current fiscal developments in the Euro area can rather be seen as joint
implementation of policy interventions across countries. As such, it may be more relevant to trace
the effects of combinations of these basic shocks and define different policy scenarios of interest.
Such policy interventions are defined through linear combinations of basic spending shocks that
generate a desired combined response in domestic and foreign expenditures. We interpret these
linear combinations as coordinated policy scenarios and view the resulting output responses as
the effects of coordinated fiscal policy shocks. In particular, we analyse three different linear
combinations of basic, structural shocks defined by the following joint dynamics/restrictions:
• Scenario 1: Government spending in Spain, Italy, France or Germany decreases by one
13One could also imagine a common shock originating outside the Euro area (e.g.: US policy change, oil supply
shock, economic crisis in the ROW). However, such shocks can hardly be considered to be fundamental with
respect to the variables included in the model. This implies that the space spanned by the reduced form errors
(and thus by the information in the observed data included in the model) would not correspond to the space of
such “structural” shocks. This makes a recovery of such structural shocks from the estimated reduced form errors
impossible.
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percent for four quarters while expenditures in the remaining three countries remain un-
changed.
• Scenario 2: Government spending in Spain and Italy (South) decreases by one percent
for four quarters while expenditures in France and Germany (North) remain unchanged.
• Scenario 3: Government spending in Spain and Italy (South) decreases by one percent
for four quarters while expenditures in France and Germany (North) increase by one
percent.
5 Results
5.1 “Plain-vanilla” VAR
Before we present the results using our multi-country FAVAR, it is relevant to understand how
a more simple model would perform in identifying the domestic and cross-border effects of fiscal
policy. Is including only a very small number of variables in a VAR sufficient to reasonably
identify the effects of fiscal policy? Would disregarding bilateral trade and financial linkages
still result in meaningful, interpretable spillover effects?
To this aim, we first estimate a four-country unrestricted VAR(1) where only output and
government expenditures are included. The four fiscal shocks are identified by sign restrictions,14
and are linearly combined to replicate Scenario 1 above. Each of the four graphs in Figure 1,
titled Germany, France Italy, Spain, include the response of that particular GDP to each of the
four (coordinated) domestic fiscal shocks (Scenario 1). These graphs, therefore, summarise both
domestic effects (the response in country i to a shock i, i = 1, ..., 4) as well as spillovers (response
of GDP in country i to a shock j, j , i). Filled markers indicate significant responses at the
68% level. While we, of course, do not know how domestic and foreign economic aggregates
actually respond to fiscal shocks, we are still able to interpret whether the responses obtained
look reasonable. First, we notice that economic activity in Germany and Italy reacts stronger
and more persistently to a foreign (French) consolidation than to a domestic fiscal shock. The
magnitude of the response in German GDP is, at times, even larger when compared to the
output effect in the country where the shock originates. While we believe that the Eurozone
countries share strong ties and that domestic shocks have significant cross-border effects, we find
it difficult to reconcile these findings with economic intuition. Such results resonate with the
unreasonably large spillovers obtained by Hebous and Zimermann (2013). Second, we obtain
14omitting the orthogonality restriction on a business cycle shock, which we are no longer able to identify in a
meaningful way from one variable (GDP)
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both positive and negative output responses to a fiscal consolidation in Germany. What is,
however, counterintuitive is that these delayed, positive spillovers on France and Italy and
Spain arise after the negative domestic influence of the German shock has already died out.
Third, Italian and Spanish shocks do not appear to induce significant effects on any of the
two core countries. This result is particularly puzzling for the Spanish shock, considering the
negative, significant and long lasting output impact of a domestic fiscal consolidation in Spain.
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Figure 1: Domestic and cross-border effects of coordinated fiscal shocks (Scenario 1) using an unrestricted
VAR(1) in output and government expenditures. Each of the four graphs include the response of that
particular GDP to each of the four coordinated fiscal shocks. Filled markers indicate significant responses
at the 68% level.
As a second benchmark, we estimate a modified multi-country FAVAR with the important
difference that bilateral trade and financial variables are no longer included.15 The responses
in output following a coordinated domestic fiscal consolidation (Scenario 1) are summarised in
Figure 2. First, we again observe that fiscal spillovers are at times larger than the effects of a do-
mestic shock, particularly when looking at the German and Spanish shocks. Furthermore, these
two fiscal shocks induce controversial dynamics in their output: each shock results in a large,
15That would imply that the auxiliary model (7), used for estimating the factors, reduces to Yt = ΦYt−1 +
ΛFFt + vt.
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negative and long-lasting contraction in the domestic economy and a positive and quantitatively
similar expansion in the other country. Third, with the exception of temporary contractionary
effects on France and Germany, spillovers from an Italian consolidation are mostly insignificant.
It is interesting to note that many of the responses obtained using this modified multi-country
FAVAR share some similarities with the results of the unrestricted eight-variable VAR(1) de-
scribed above.
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Figure 2: Domestic and cross-border effects of coordinated fiscal shocks (Scenario 1) using a multi-country
FAVAR(1) which does not include bilateral trade and financial variables. Each of the four graphs include
the response of that particular GDP to each of the four coordinated fiscal shocks. Filled markers indicate
significant responses at the 68% level.
After summarising the output responses to fiscal shocks in a small scale unrestricted VAR
and a simplified version of our multi-country model, we now proceed to presenting the results
obtained using the multi-country FAVAR model (8).
5.2 Basic fiscal shocks
We briefly discuss the responses to our “basic” fiscal shocks before moving to the potentially more
interesting policy combinations. Results for Spain (Figure 7), Italy (Figure 8), France (Figure
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9) and Germany (Figure 10) following a fiscal expansion are included in Appendix C. First, an
expansionary fiscal shock has a positive and persistent impact on the economy implementing
the expansionary policy. Domestic GDP, consumption and investment increase for the first
eight to ten quarters following the fiscal shock. German output growth, in particular, remains
consistently above zero throughout the 20 quarters horizon. Except for a very short lived initial
drop in French and German consumption, we do not find evidence of crowding-out effects in
the expanding economy. Second, domestic fiscal shocks induce significant albeit qualitatively
smaller increases in foreign output.
In order to summarise and more easily compare domestic and foreign induced output effects,
we jointly plot the GDP responses in Figure 3 (with the impact response of government expen-
diture in each country normalised to one). Across all countries, the impact of domestic fiscal
policy is consistently larger in comparison to individual, spillover induced effects. The Italian
fiscal shock appears to generate relatively long-lived output spillovers, especially on Germany
and Spain. Interestingly, the influence that a fiscal consolidation in Italy exerts on the other
foreign economies persists even after the response in domestic (i.e. Italian) output dies out. The
French fiscal shock has a significant effect on all foreign GDP series during the initial year. Ger-
many also generates temporary spillovers, although the magnitude is quite modest. Particularly
in the case of Spain, the influence of the German shock is mostly insignificant.
It is important to note that our basic expansionary fiscal shocks do not eliminate the pos-
sibility that government expenditures in the remaining countries comove. Following a Spanish
fiscal shock (Figure 7), for example, the increase in domestic spending is coupled with a quan-
titatively and qualitatively similar pattern in Italian, French and German expenditures. It is
hence difficult to disentangle pure, domestically generated effects on the expanding economy
from influences induced by the comovement in government spending across countries. It is for
this reason that the results using the basic fiscal shocks should be interpreted with care.
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Figure 3: Domestic and cross-border effects of basic fiscal shocks using our multi-country FAVAR. Each
of the four graphs include the response of that particular GDP to each of the four basic fiscal shocks.
Filled markers indicate significant responses at the 68% level.
5.3 Coordinated fiscal shocks
We now discuss the impulse responses obtained following a coordinated fiscal consolidation
(Scenario 1). The graphs summarising the results for each of the four countries included in
our analysis can be found in Appendix D.
A Spanish shock (Figure 11) leads to a drop in aggregate activity, consumption and invest-
ment. Output does not recover during the 20 quarters following the fiscal shock. The decline
in consumption is more short lived and can be explained by a temporary drop in real wages.
Confidence falls on impact and its response remains negative for approximately one year. It
is interesting to note that the deterioration in economic sentiment is mirrored by an increase
in Spanish government bond yields. Fiscal consolidation in Italy (Figure 12) also results in a
significant drop in output. The movement in GDP appears to be driven by a decline in private
consumption and, more importantly, to a substantial and persistent drop in private investment.
Confidence declines on impact but, in contrast to the Spanish case, remains below zero for a
prolonged period of time. The fall in confidence is also reflected in higher Italian long-term
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borrowing costs.
The domestic responses in economic activity following a fiscal consolidation in France are
summarised in Figure 13. The temporary decline in GDP can also be mainly attributed to a fall
in investment, although the contraction in aggregate activity is shorter lived in comparison to
the Italian case. Despite the fall in confidence, however, sovereign yields in France decline. We
obtain a similar and qualitatively even larger result on German yields following a government
spending cut in Germany (Figure 14). It appears that a fiscal consolidation in the core coun-
tries is perceived differently by the bond market when compared to the peripheral economies.
Nonetheless, the German shock induces significant and long lasting effects on German GDP.
We summarise the effects of coordinated fiscal consolidations on output in one compact graph
(Figure 4). We observe that economic activity consistently reacts stronger to a domestic con-
solidation than to a foreign fiscal shock.16 The puzzling result of proportionally larger spillover
effects obtained using the two simplified models in Section 5.1 and obtained by Hebous and
Zimmermann (2013) using the GVAR appears to have disappeared. Cross-border spillovers are
heterogenous and depend on where the fiscal shock originates as well as on the foreign country
considered. Spain and Italy have a significant albeit short lived influence on German GDP, al-
though delayed, second round effects do re-emerge two years after an Italian shock. The Spanish
shock, in particular, appears to induce a strong, negative influence on foreign output. Note that
the counterintuitive dynamics between the Spanish and German GDP obtained in Section 5.1
are now no longer detected. Similar spillovers are generated on the French economy: the Italian
fiscal shock has a negative and even more persistent impact than on Germany and spillovers
from Spain are, again, large and significant during the first four quarters. One reason behind the
distinct influence of a Spanish shock can be traced back to the dynamics of confidence in Figure
11: the fiscal consolidation induces a strong instantaneous decline in the economic sentiment
indicator across all countries and the deterioration in the ESI lasts for one year in Spain, France
and Germany. This comovement appears to be connected to the significant but short lived
joint decline in output levels. Our findings suggest that confidence may play a role in the trans-
mission of fiscal policy not only domestically, as recently investigated by Bachmann and Sims
(2012), but also across borders. Spillovers from a German fiscal shock are, maybe surprisingly,
mostly insignificant.17 With the exception of delayed significant responses of investment and
16In the identification of each domestic fiscal shock, the government expenditures in the remaining countries are
restricted not to move. Consequently, the size of the response in GDP to a fiscal consolidation can be interpreted
as a multiplier.
17When looking at spillover effects on Spain, we observe that output initially increases in response to a German
fiscal consolidation, a result we also obtained when disregarding cross-border variables in Section 5.1. The positive
effect on Spanish GDP is, however, smaller, less persistent and switches its sign towards the end of the response
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government expenditure in Spain and France (see Figure 14), GDP and its components remain
unaffected in all countries. What is interesting is that the fall in economic sentiment in the
contracting country (Germany) does not, in this case, feed back into lower levels of confidence
in the remaining three economies. This further supports the hypothesis that the confidence
channel may offer valuable insights into the propagation of fiscal policy shocks.
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Figure 4: Domestic and cross-border effects of coordinated fiscal shocks (Scenario 1) using our multi-
country FAVAR. Each of the four graphs include the response of that particular GDP to each of the four
coordinated fiscal shocks. Full shapes indicate significant responses at the 68% level.
The linear combination of domestic fiscal shocks that jointly decreases government spending
in Spain and Italy during four consecutive quarters while keeping expenditure in Germany and
France unchanged (Scenario 2) results in the impulse responses in Figure 5. First, we observe
that output, consumption and investment decline in Italy and Spain. Crucially, the negative
effects on output in these two countries are more pronounced when both economies engage in
a process of fiscal consolidation at the same time. Aggregate activity in Spain, in particular,
does not recover in the 20 quarters following the shock and the combined output loss is higher
than when compared to Figure 11. Italy experiences a stronger decline in the first year but,
window.
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surprisingly, recovers quicker than in Figure 12. Second, the fall in the three price/cost indicators
is relatively large and permanent. Third, we again obtain a temporary decline in confidence levels
coupled with an even larger and more persistent increase in government bond yields.
The coordinated spending consolidation also results in important cross border effects. With
the exception of insignificant contemporaneous reactions, we observe a decline in French and
German output and private consumption for approximately one year. Investment is generally
unaffected. The magnitude of output spillovers during these four quarters is larger than those
observed in Figures 11, Figure 12 and summarised by Figure 4. Confidence strongly declines on
impact across all countries but the response quickly becomes insignificant. A relatively puzzling
finding is that economic sentiment in Italy recovers much faster when Spain also engages in a
process of fiscal consolidation. The recovery in confidence following a strong initial drop is con-
sistent with the larger but less persistent domestic and cross border output effects. For example,
German GDP, government expenditure, private investment, and ESI no longer experience the
double-dip contraction highlighted in Figures 12 and 4 (green diamond markers).
Policy Scenario 3 is defined as a linear combination in all four basic fiscal shocks which
generates an increase in government expenditure in the North by one percent for four quarters
coupled with a decline in spending in the South (Figure 6).18 The responses in Italian output
and investment are negative for the first four quarters following the shock but become insignif-
icant thereafter. The magnitude of the decline in Italian GDP is smaller and the downturn
is shorter lived than the one highlighted in Figure 5. For Spain, we observe that aggregate
economic activity and private investment decline at a similar pace as under Scenario 2. An
important difference, however, is that private consumption is no longer affected in either of the
two peripheral countries with the exception of a temporary decline in Spain in the initial two
quarters. When looking at the responses of France and Germany, we observe that investment in-
creases for the first two years. Most surprisingly, aggregate activity no longer moves in response
to a fiscal expansion in the core economies. We even observe a short lived decline in French
consumption. Spillovers from the contractionary fiscal policy implemented in the South appear
to counteract the positive output effects highlighted by Figure 3. Confidence, again, appears
to play an important role. The economic sentiment indicator in Germany does not increase
in response to an expansionary fiscal policy when Italy and Spain are hit by a negative fiscal
shock. This comes in contrast to the strong, positive relationship between German GDP and
18It would be imprecise to call such a coordinated shock a union-wide “balanced-budget” policy scenario. One
would need to trace the actual effects that the 1% change generates on expenditures in each country. Under some
assumptions, it could be possible to define more accurate weights in the linear combination which leaves total
expenditures unchanged.
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ESI observed in Figure 14.
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Figure 5: Coordinated Spending Shock: Southern Europe. Impulse responses with 68% CI
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Figure 6: Coordinated Spending Shock: North-South Balanced. Impulse responses with 68% CI
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6 Conclusion
Since the start of the financial crisis in 2008, researchers and policy-makers have shown renewed
interest in the role of fiscal policy. While there is a large literature dealing with the impact
of fiscal policy in closed economies, very few authors address the issue of cross-border effects
of fiscal shocks (Hebous and Zimmerman, 2012, 2013, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013).
Recent empirical papers have relied on a number of simplifying assumptions in their modelling
approach, either by limiting the number of cross-sectional units, restricting the channels of inter-
dependence, imposing cross-sectional homogeneity or disregarding feedback effects across units.
Our contribution to the growing literature of cross-border effects of fiscal policy is threefold.
First, we propose a multi-country FAVAR model with both observable and unobservable factors
by combining the multi-country VAR approach of Canova and Ciccarelli (2009) with the FAVAR
framework of Bernanke et al. (2005). Second, we extract information from both domestic and
cross-border variables that, according to economic theory, are expected to be relevant for identi-
fying the effects of fiscal policy. Using macroeconomic and fiscal aggregates from the four largest
Eurozone countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) as well as variables capturing cross-border
linkages, we investigate the domestic and cross-border effects of country specific government
expenditure shocks. Third, we pay particular attention to the identification of (structural) fiscal
policy interventions. To this aim, we use a more agnostic, sign restriction based identification
approach. By linearly combining the identified country specific fiscal shocks we are also able to
trace the effects of coordinated policy scenarios.
We find negative and significant effects of fiscal consolidations on domestic output, private
investment and consumption for all countries. Domestic multipliers range between 0.5 for Italy
and 1 for Germany and never surpass unity. Cross-border spillovers are heterogenous and
depend on where the expenditure shock originates as well as on the foreign country considered.
Importantly, economic activity consistently reacts stronger to a domestic consolidation than to
a foreign fiscal shock. Our results indicate that a negative Italian shock leads to significant and
persistent decline in German, French and Spanish output. A Spanish consolidation induces a
quantitatively larger but shorter-lived decline in foreign output. Spillovers following a negative
fiscal policy shock in France are, maybe surprisingly, mostly insignificant. We compare our
results with two benchmark, simplified multi-country models: an unrestricted VAR in output
and government consumption and a multi-country FAVAR which does not include bilateral trade
and banking flow variables. We observe several puzzles in the magnitude and sign of the GDP
response to domestic and foreign fiscal shocks. Most of the counterintuitive dynamics no longer
emerge in our final multi-country FAVAR and we obtain reasonable domestic and cross-border
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multipliers.
We further find that coordinated spending cuts in the periphery induce significant, albeit
shorter lived output spillovers. The negative impact on foreign GDP in the first year following a
joint consolidation is larger compared to when government expenditures decline in Italy or Spain
only. The magnitude of cross-border spillovers never surpasses domestic multipliers, in contrast
to the unreasonably large foreign induced effects obtained by Hebous and Zimmermann (2013).
Although the sample is different and a direct comparison may not be appropriate, our spillover
effects are also much smaller than those obtained by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013). We
also investigate the possibly relevant policy scenario of a fiscal contraction in the South coupled
with a fiscal expansion in the North. The response of economic activity in Germany and France
is now mostly unaffected by the increase in government expenditure. It appears that spillovers
from the contractionary fiscal policy implemented in the South counteract the expansionary
aggregate demand effects in the North. Spain and Italy continue to experience a downturn,
with the important difference that private consumption in both peripheral countries is no longer
affected.
Our findings suggest that confidence may play a role in the transmission of fiscal policy
not only domestically, as recently investigated by Bachmann and Sims (2012), but also across
borders. Systematic movements in confidence may convey important insights into the response
of aggregate economic activity. A domestic fiscal consolidations is generally reflected in a sig-
nificant, instantaneous decline in domestic economic sentiment. Only when confidence levels in
a foreign country comove with confidence in the economy where the fiscal shock originates are
spillovers significant. A second interesting finding is the inverse relationship between sovereign
bond yields and confidence in Spain and Italy. There is a contrasting bond market reaction with
respect to the core and peripheral countries: while Spanish and Italian yields increase in re-
sponse to a domestic fiscal consolidation, French and German borrowing costs generally decline
or remain unaffected.
A first important extension to our model is controlling for the stance of monetary policy.
The effect of fiscal policy derived from different theoretical models can be highly sensitive to
whether monetary policy is accommodative or contractionary. However, identifying monetary
policy shocks and their effects on macroeconomic and financial aggregates is a complex issue in
itself. Moreover, we believe that the losses from disregarding monetary policy should be limited.
In a monetary union, the central bank cannot increase or decrease its policy rate in response
to country specific economic developments and the policy stance is common across the region.
Therefore, regardless of the prevailing policy rate at the union level, the relative monetary policy
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between any two countries is fixed. Second, possible non-linear effects of fiscal policy could be
introduced in this multi-country FAVAR by defining further factors. Third, we believe that
the interesting relationship between fiscal shocks, confidence and output merits further work.
Barsky and Sims (2012) highlight that innovations in confidence largely reflect information about
future economic fundamentals and productivity shocks. This suggests that fiscal policy targeted
towards (productive) government investments may be more strongly related to a systematic
response in confidence (Bachman and Sims, 2012). It may therefore be relevant to further
separate our aggregated government expenditure variable into its two main components: final
consumption expenditure and investments.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix we summarise the time series used in the empirical analysis, specifying the
exact variable name, code (if available), database and source. All series are quarterly, 1999:Q1
to 2012:Q4. We use seasonally adjusted data and, when not available, we applied a Census X-12
adjustment method on the raw data.
Output: Gross Domestic Product - Expenditure Approach (B1 GE), Quarterly National Ac-
counts, OECD.
Consumption: Private final consumption expenditure (P31S14 S15), Quarterly National Ac-
counts, OECD.
Investment: Gross fixed capital formation (P51), Quarterly National Accounts, OECD.
Government Expenditure: General government final consumption expenditure (P3) plus
Government gross capital formation (D.5), Government Statistics, Eurostat.
Price and competitiveness: Real Wages, Unit Labour Costs, Harmonised Consumer Price
Index - all items, Main Economic Indicators, OECD.
Confidence: Economic Sentiment Indicator (BS ESI I), Eurostat.
Sovereign bond yields: Long-term government bond yields - 10 year, Main Economic Indi-
cators, OECD.
Trade: Bilateral exports (BDQ7D0FRA, BDQ7D0ITA, BDQ7D0ESA, FRQ7D0BDA,
FRQ7D0ITA, FRQ7D0ESA, ITQ7D0BDA, ITQ7D0FRA, ITQ7D0ESA, ESQ7D0FRA,
ESQ7D0BDA, ESQ7D0ITA), Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF.
Financial claims: Consolidated claims - immediate borrower basis, Consolidated banking
statistics, BIS
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Appendix B
In this Appendix we give a brief outline of the estimation strategy as well as a more detailed
description of the penalty function approach for the identification of structural shocks.
Estimation
Let yi,t be a K dimensional column vector containing domestic variables of country i, and Ft,
of dimension r × 1, a series of latent factors summarising a large amount of information. We
assume that the joint dynamics of Yt = [y′i,t, ..., y′N,t]′ and Ft can be represented by the following
multivariate autoregression (multi-country FAVAR model):
Yt
Ft
 =
A B
C D

Yt−1
Ft−1
+
wy,t−1
wf,t−1,
 (8)
where A,C are parameter matrices which obey a pre-imposed structure while B and D are
unrestricted. More specifically, as mentioned in the text, A and C can be expressed as linear
combinations of loadings related to observable factors. The fact that A and C can be expressed
in terms of linear combinations of a small number of underlying parameters makes the estimation
of (8) particularly easy, since the model can be expressed in terms of a linearly restricted VAR.
For this purpose we can write (8) in SUR form as
zt = (zt−1 ⊗ IKNr)Ωθ, (9)
where zt = vec ([Y ′t F ′t ]′) and Ω is a predetremined selection matrix which linearly combines the
loadings in θ, such that Ωθ = vec

A B
C D

. The parameter vector θ can be (efficiently)
estimated by regressing zt on (zt−1 ⊗ IKNr)Ω by (two-stage) GLS.
Since Ft is unobserved we need to estimate it first. To this aim, consider the auxiliary model
Yt = φYt−1 + ΛF1 Ft + vy,t (10)
Xt = ΛF2 Ft + vx,t, (11)
where Xt is the set of variables releated to bilateral linkages. The auxiliary model in (10) and
(11) reveals the interpretation of the latent factors in Ft: they summarise the information not
captured by the observable factor model of Yt = φYt−1 (implied by the parametrisation of φ)
and the information contained in Xt.
Conditional on ΛF1 and Ft, φ can be estimated by GLS in a similar way as (9) and, conditional
on φ, the latent factors Ft and their loadings ΛF1 ,ΛF2 , can be estimated by principal components.
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The number of latent factors can be determined by standard model selection criteria (see e.g.
Bai and Ng, 2002). Applying a variety of criteria suggested in the literature, we find that in our
analysis two factors are sufficient to summarise the information.19
Instead of imposing identifying restrictions to estimate (10)-(11) jointly, we iteratively esti-
mate φ by GLS and Ft, ΛF1 , and ΛF2 by principal components until convergence.
Since the number of time series observations is relatively small, the bootstrap might be
superior to inference constructed based on asymptotic arguments. The bootstrap in factor
augmented regressions has recently been shown to be asymptotically valid in Goncalves and
Perron (2014). To construct confidence intervals for the impulse responses we implement the
residual-based bootstrap algorithm proposed by Yamamoto (2012).
The penalty function
We deviate from the identification approach proposed in Mountford and Uhlig (2009) in two
respects. First, we identify all shocks simultaneously (and not sequentially) and we use a dif-
ferent penalty function. We believe that the sequential identification is too restrictive since it
constraints the parameter space of shocks identified in a subsequent stage, which cannot be eas-
ily motivated in our setting. Second, we use a slightly different functional form of the penalty
function. More precisely, the criterion to be maximised over [q1, ..., qS ] =: Q ∈ VS(RKN+r),
which corresponds to the set of all orthonormal S-frames in RKN+r, is given by
Q(q1, .., qS) =
∑
s∈S
∑
p∈Ps
V −1s
∑
v∈Vs
g(as,p,v · qs),
where S corresponds to the total number of shocks to be identified, Ps denotes the number
of periods a particular shock is restricted to follow the imposed sign, and Vs is the number
of variables a particular shock is assumed to affect. The row vector as,p,v corresponds to the
associated row in the respective orthogonalised MA coefficient, transformed such that possibly
negative sign restrictions are translated into positive ones. The weight V −1s is needed to give
equal weight to every shock, independent of the number of variables restricted. The penalty
function g(x) is chosen such that it is twice continuously differentiable and gradient based
optimisation algorithms can be used. More specifically, we assume g(x) = 100(x2sgn(x) + x2).
19The results shown in the paper refer to the model estimated with two factors. The results do not change
qualitatively when choosing either two or three factors. Note also, that increasing the number of factors leads to
an over-proportional increase in the number of parameters to be estimated in the final model in (8).
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Appendix C: Basic expansionary fiscal shocks
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Figure 7: Non-coordinated Spending Shock: Spain. Impulse responses with 68% CI
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Figure 8: Non-coordinated Spending Shock: Italy. Impulse responses with 68% CI
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Figure 9: Non-coordinated Spending Shock: France. Impulse responses with 68% CI
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Figure 10: Non-coordinated Spending Shock: Germany. Impulse responses with 68% CI
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Appendix D: Coordinated fiscal shocks (Scenario 1)
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Figure 11: Coordinated Spending Shock: Spain. Impulse responses with 68% CI
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Figure 12: Coordinated Spending Shock: Italy. Impulse responses with 68% CI
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Figure 13: Coordinated Spending Shock: France. Impulse responses with 68% CI
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Figure 14: Coordinated Spending Shock: Germany. Impulse responses with 68% CI
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